We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve the tragedy, taking seriously non-negligible aspects of that problem and the real application of mechanisms. The mechanism permits agents to choose their own labor time freely, and to announce their labor skills freely not only if they choose to understate them, but also if they overstate them. It doubly implements the proportional solution [Roemer and Silvestre (1989, 1993)] in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal game form, while it triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive game form.
Introduction
It is well-known as the "tragedy of commons," that in cooperative production economies, the resource allocations under free access to technology result in "overproduction" and inefficient Nash equilibria. This paper provides a mechanism which can solve this tragedy problem. As a normative solution for the tragedy, we adopt the proportional solution [Roemer and Silvestre (1993) ] under joint ownership of the technology, which assigns Pareto efficient allocations where each agent's output consumption is proportional to his labor contribution. Then, we construct an incentive compatible mechanism which implements the proportional solution.
There are some works on implementation of the proportional solution, such as Suh (1995) , Yoshihara (1999 Yoshihara ( , 2000 , and Tian (2000) , as well as of other social choice correspondences in production economies. 1 However, in most of the literature on implementation in production economies, a nonnegligible problem of asymmetric information involved in the production process seems to be treated as a "black box." Under any mechanism, each agent is usually required to announce some information, and the outcome function assigns an allocation to each profile of agents' strategies. This implicitly assumes, in the case of production economies with labor input, that the mechanism coordinator is authorized to make agents supply their labor hours to be consistent with the assigned allocation. 2 This happens because the original concern of implementation theory has been in adverse selection problems, and such a focus is valid whenever we consider decentralized resource allocations in exchange economies and/or production economies with no labor input. However, in production economies with labor input, such an implicit assumption is not so realisitic.
In this paper, alternatively, we suppose that the coordinator is not authorized to make agents work as he wants; he can monitor each agent's labor hour, but he cannot perfectly monitor each agent's labor contribution measured in efficiency units, since he is incapable of observing each agent's labor skill or labor intensity exercised in the production process. Thus, there may be an incentive for each agent to overstate as well as understate his own labor skill or labor intensity.
3 Even under such a more realistic model of the tragedy of commons, the incentive compatible mechanism in this paper can implement the solution.
The mechanism we propose here is a type of sharing mechanism: each agent can freely supply his labor hour, 4 and he is asked to give some information about his demand for the consumption good and his labor skill. After that, the outcome function only distributes the produced output to agents, according to the given information and the record of their supply of labor hours done. Here, there is no restriction on strategy spaces which prohibits agents from understating or overstating their labor skills. We will show in this study that this mechanism triply implements the proportional solution in Nash, strong Nash, and subgame perfect equilibria.
In the following discussion, a basic model of economies and sharing mechanisms is defined in Section 2. Section 3 provides a sharing mechanism which implements the proportional solution. Concluding remarks are in Section 4. All the proofs of the theorems here will be relegated to the Appendix.
The Basic Model
There are two goods, one of which is an input good (labor time) x ∈ R + to be used to produce the other good y ∈ R + . 5 The population in the society is given by the set N = {1, . . . , n}, where 2 ≤ n < +∞. Each agent i 0 s consumption vector is denoted by z i = (x i , y i ), where x i denotes his labor time, and y i denotes his assigned amount of output consumption. It is assumed that all agents face a common upper bound of labor timex , where 0 <x < +∞, so that they have the same consumption set [0,x] × R + . Each 3 Tian (2000) constructed a mechanism which implements the proportional solution even if the coordinator does not know the agents' endowment vectors of commodities under the assumption that agents cannot overstate their endowments. As Tian (2000) himself mentioned, such an assumption may be justified when endowments consist only of material goods, since the coordinator can require agents to "place the claimed endowments on the table" (Hurwicz et al. (1995) ). In our setting where endowments are labor skills, however, such a requirement is no longer forceful, since the coordinator may not inspect the amount of labor skills in advance of production.
4 Thus, our mechanism is labor sovereign (Kranich (1994); Yoshihara (2000a) ) which is not satisfied in the previous mechanisms (Suh (1995) , Yoshihara (1999 Yoshihara ( , 2000 , Tian (2000) ).
5 The symbol R + denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. agent i 0 s preference is defined on [0,x] × R + and represented by a utility function u i : [0,x] × R + → R which is continuous and quasi-concave on [0,x] × R + , and strictly monotonic (decreasing in labor time and increasing in the share of output) on [0, x) × R ++ . 6 We denote by U the class of such utility functions. Each agent i is also characterized by a labor skill which is represented by a positive real number, s t i ∈ R ++ . The superscript t on s t i
indicates "true," so that s t i denotes agent i 0 s true labor skill. The universal set of labor skills for all agents is denoted by S = R ++ .
7 The labor skill s t i ∈ S implies i 0 s labor endowment per unit of labor time, which is measured in efficiency units. It can also be interpreted as i 0 s labor intensity which would be exercised in the production process: that is, i 0 s labor input per unit of labor time measured in efficiency units. Thus, if his supply of labor time is x i ∈ [0,x] and his labor intensity is s t i ∈ S, then it is s t i x i ∈ R + which implies his labor contribution to the production process measured in efficiency units. The production technology is described by a production function f : R + → R + which is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and f (0) = 0. For simplicity, we fix a production function f for all economies. Thus, the economy is characterized by a pair of profiles e ≡ (u, s t ) with u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ U n and s t = (s
We denote by Z (s t ) the set of feasible allocations for
The proportional solution [Roemer and Silvestre (1993) ] is a correspondence P R :
n such that for each economy e = (u, s t ) ∈ E, any z = (x i , y i ) i∈N ∈ P R (e) is a Pareto efficient allocation for e, where for all i ∈ N, y i =
The symbol R ++ denotes the set of positive real numbers. 7 For any two sets X and Y , X ⊆ Y whenever any x ∈ X also belongs to Y , and X ( Y if and only if X ⊆ Y and not (Y ⊆ X).
) is labor sovereign if for every i ∈ N and every x i ∈ [0,x], there exists a strategy m i ∈ M i such that for any
Sharing mechanisms
We are interested in labor sovereign game forms, and focus on sharing mechanisms that only distribute output among the agents according to their announcements on their private information (s, w) ∈ S n × R n + and their supplied labor time x ∈ [0,x] n . A sharing mechanism is a function g :
n , and any w ∈ R n + , g (s, x, w) = y, where s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) denotes the agents' reported skills and w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) their desired amounts of output consumption. A sharing mechanism g is feasible if for any s t ∈ S n , any s ∈ S n , any x ∈ [0,x] n , and any w ∈ R n + , (x, g (s, x, w)) ∈ Z (s t ). Note in feasible sharing mechanisms, even without the true information of labor skills s t , the total amount of output f ( P s t k x k ) is observable after the production process, since the coordinator can hold all of the produced output. Note also that any feasible sharing mechanism is a labor sovereign normal-form game form. 8 We denote by G the class of such feasible sharing mechanisms. Given a feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G, a feasible sharing game is defined for each economy e ∈ E as a non-cooperative game (N, (S × [0,x] × R + ) n , g, e). Fixing the set of players N and their strategy sets (S × [0,x] × R + ) n , we simply denote a feasible sharing game
be another strategy profile which is obtained by replacing the i-th component (s i , x i , w i ) of (s, x, w) with (s
+ is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the feasible sharing game (g, e) if, for any i ∈ N and any
Denote by NE (g, e) the set of Nash equilibria of (g, e).
n is a Nash equilibrium allocation of the feasible 8 More correctly, any feasible sharing mechanism g is also expressed as a game form , w) ). Clearly, Γ g is a labor sovereign normal-form game form, which is uniquely corresponding to g.
sharing game (g, e) if there exists (s, w) ∈ S n × R n + such that (s, x, w) ∈ NE (g, e) and y = g (s, x, w) where x = (x i ) i∈N and y = (y i ) i∈N . Denote by NA (g, e) the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of (g, e). A feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G is said to implement the proportional solution on E in Nash equilibria, if for all e ∈ E, NA (g, e) = P R (e).
A strategy profile (s
+ is a (pure-strategy) strong (Nash) equilibrium of the feasible sharing game (g, e), if for any T ⊆ N and any
Denote by SNE (g, e) the set of strong equilibria of (g, e).
n is a strong equilibrium allocation of the feasible sharing game (g, e) if there exists (s, w) ∈ S n × R n + such that (s, x, w) ∈ SNE (g, e) and y = g (s, x, w). Denote by SNA (g, e) the set of strong equilibrium allocations of (g, e). A feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G is said to implement the proportional solution on E in strong equilibria, if for all e ∈ E, SNA (g, e) = P R (e). Moreover, a feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G is said to doubly implement the proportional solution on E in Nash and strong equilibria, if for all e ∈ E, NA (g, e) = SNA (g, e) = P R (e).
Timing Problem in Sharing Mechanisms
Before discussing our own sharing mechanism for implementing the proportional solution, we should mention the timing problem of strategy-decision in real applications of sharing mechanisms, which is particularly relevent to the case of production economies. Note that the strategic action for (s, w) is only to announce a pair of two real numbers, while the strategic action for x is to engage in production activity by supplying that amount of labor time. Thus, there may be a time difference between the point in time when (s, w) is announced and the period when x is exercised. It implies that there may be at least two polar cases of time sequence of decision making: the agents may annouce (s, w) before they supply their labor hours, or they may annouce (s, w) after each agent supplies his labor time x. In the former case, each agent i may decide his supply of labor time with the knowledge of the messages (s, w), while in the latter case, he may decide his message (s i , w i ) with the knowledge of agents' actions x in production process.
Consequently, we may derive at least the following two types of two-stage game forms from the original normal form sharing mechanism. Given a feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G, the (1) type g-implicit two-stage mechanism Γ 1 g is a two-stage extensive game form in which the first stage consists of selecting (s, w) from S n × R n + , the second stage consists of selecting x from [0,x] n , and the final stage assigns an outcome which is the same value as g (s, x, w) for every choice (s, w) ∈ S n × R n + in the first stage and every choice x ∈ [0,x] n in the second stage. Given g ∈ G, the (2) type g-implicit two-stage mechanism Γ 2 g is a two-stage extensive game form in which the first stage consists of selecting x from [0,x] n , the second stage consists of selecting (s, w) from S n × R n + , and the final stage assigns an outcome which is the same value as g (s, x, w) for every choice x ∈ [0,x] n in the first stage and every choice (s, w) ∈ S n × R n + in the second stage. Given the feasible (1) type g-implicit two-stage game
and each strategy profile (s, w) ∈ S n × R n + in the first stage of the game
, let us denote its corresponding second stage subgame by
n be a Nash equilibrium mapping such that for each
Denote the set of such Nash equilibrium mappings in second stage subgames of the game
, if for any i ∈ N and any (s i , w i ) ∈ S × R + , 
by Ω e . A strategy profile (x * , ω e * ) ∈ [0,x] n × Ω e is a (pure-strategy)
subgame-perfect (Nash) equilibrium of the feasible (2) 
, if for any i ∈ N and any x i ∈ [0,x],
n is a subgame-perfect equilibrium allocation of the game
) is said to implement the proportional solution on E in subgame-perfect equilibria, if for all e ∈ E,
) is said to doubly implement the proportional solution on E in Nash and subgameperfect equilibria, if for all e ∈ E,
) is said to triply implement the proportional solution on E in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria, if for all e ∈ E,
3 Implementation of the proportional solution
In the following, we add two additional assumptions.
Assumption 1 (boundary condition):
Assumption 2:
The production function f is continuously differentiable.
We denote by f 0 (x) the derivative of f at x.
Nash and strong implementability
In this subsection, we will set aside the timing problem of sharing mechanisms and propose a sharing mechanism as a normal form game form, which doubly implements the proportional solution in Nash and strong equilibria. To propose our mechanism, let us introduce four feasible sharing mechanisms defined as follows:
• g P R is such that for each strategy profile (s,
•
• g m is such that for each strategy profile (s,
and real amount of produced output f ¡P s t j x j ¢ , and for all i ∈ N,
• g d is such that for each strategy profile (s,
Note that g (ẑ,b s) is designed to implementẑ in Nash equilibrium under some economy with b s. Ifẑ is Pareto efficient for some economy with b s, say (b u,b s), thenẑ becomes a Nash equilibrium allocation of the game
, since each agent's attainable allocations by his unilateral deviation fromẑ are the points in the "budget set" defined by the supporting price f 0 ( P b s jxj ) at ẑ. Secondly, g m assigns all of the produced output to only one agent who provides the maximal interior amount of labor time and reports a maximal amount of demand for the output, where the scheme µ (x −i ) is introduced to have agents find their best response strategies.
Given
should be a P R-optimal allocation for some economy with s. Let us call such a (s, x, w) a PR-consistent strategy profile. Note that if g P R (s, x, w) = w holds and (x, w) is an interior allocation, then P R (s, x, w)
is the set of potential deviators under strategy profile (s, x, w), since any i ∈ N (s, x, w) can constitute a P R-consistent strategy profile with the others' fixed strategies by changing his strategy from
Note that S i (s, x, w) is closed and bounded from below, or otherwise, S i (s, x, w) = S. The latter case occurs if and only if f is linear on
We introduce a feasible sharing mechanism g * ∈ G which works in each given s t ∈ S n as follows:
It is easy to see that g * satisfies forthrightness (Saijo et al. (1996) ) and best response property (Jackson et al. (1994) ). Moreover, g * is a mechanism of the quantity type, and so satisfies self-relevancy (Hurwicz (1960) ). It is also easy to check that the mechanism g * is feasible. The mechanism g * is a combination of the four sharing mechanisms defined above: First, g * computes the expected amount of produced output f ( P s j x j ) from the data (s, x, w) and compares this with the real amount of produced output f ¡P s t j x j ¢ . In the case that these two values coincide, if the strategy profile (s, x, w) is P R-consistent, then g * applies g P R in Rule 1-1; if (s, x, w) is not P R-consistent, and there is a unique potential deviator, then g * applies g (b z,b s) in Rule 1-2-2 so as to punish him; for any other case, g * either applies g m in Rule 1-3 or assigns nothing to everyone in Rule 1-2-1.
Note that the data (b z, b s) of g (b z,b s) in Rule 1-2-2 is obtained by replacing the unique potential deviator's strategy with an appropriate one, where such an operation is possible by the definition of N (s, x, w). Note also that such (b z, b s) is essentially uniquely determined: first, b s j is uniquely determined, since if s j ∈ S j (s, x, w), then b s j = s j , while if s j / ∈ S j (s, x, w), then S j (s, x, w) is bounded from below and b s j = min S j (s, x, w). Second, once b s j is uniquely determined, then the other agents' strategies together with b s j give us the unique information about j's potential consumption vector (b x j , b w j ), whenever the production function f is strictly concave, because of the proportionality of the P R-optimal allocation. Even if f is linear, the ratios between input and output of j's potential consumption vectors should be the same value, by which the corresponding supporting price is uniquely determined.
Before we formally show the performance of g * , let us briefly explain how the mechanism induces true information of labor skills below:the mechanism g * only distributes total amounts of output f ( P s t k x k ) among agents according to the agents' strategies (s, x, w), where the coordinator cannot know whether s = s t or not. However,
, then clearly s 6 = s t holds, and there must be at least one agent, say j ∈ N, who has misreported his labor skill, s j 6 = s t j , and supplied a positive amount of labor time x j > 0. Then, this agent is definitely punished under the application of Rule 2. Secondly, consider the case that f (
Then, there are at least two agents i, j ∈ N such that s i 6 = s t i , s j 6 = s t j , x i > 0, and x j > 0; otherwise there exists at least one agent j ∈ N such that s j 6 = s t j and x j = 0. If the latter case is applied, agents such as j will be punished under the application of Rule 1-3. In the former case, one of the agents, j ∈ N, who has misrepresented his skill can induce Rule 2 by changing from x j > 0 to x 0 j = 0, together with reporting a sufficiently high level of labor skill, so as to improve his payoff, while the other misreporting agents remain punished. Thus, this case may also not correspond to an equilibrium situation, and the following lemma confirms such an insight:
Lemma 1: Let the feasible sharing mechanism g * ∈ G be given as above. Given an economy (u, s t ) ∈ E, let a strategy profile (s,
Now, we analyze the performance of g * .
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism g * ∈ G be given as above. Then, g * doubly implements the proportional solution on E in Nash and strong equilibria.
Note that the mechanism g * does not depend on the number of agents, and it works even in economies of two agents.
Implementation of the proportional solution with the timing problem
Given the mechanism g * , we can also derive the (1) type and the (2) type two-stage g * -implicit extensive game forms Γ 1 g * and Γ 2 g * respectively from g * . Because of the timing problem discussed in section 2.2, g * may be played as Γ 1 g * or Γ 2 g * . In this situation, the coordinator may not know in advance the information structure of the two-stage game induced by Γ 1 g * or Γ 2 g * , even if he has control on the number of stages in the mechanism: this information structure among agents may be characterized as perfect information, or as complete but imperfect information on the first stage.
9 In such a situation, the double implementability by Γ 1 g * (resp. Γ 2 g * ) in Nash and subgame perfect equilibria would be strongly attractive, since it keeps the desirable performance of the mechanism without relying on the information structure among agents. Fortunately, the following results would warrant this:
Theorem 2: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism g * ∈ G be given as above. Then, the (1)-type g * -implicit extensive game form doubly implements the proportional solution on E in Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria.
Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism g * ∈ G be given as above. Then, the (2)-type g * -implicit extensive game form doubly implements the proportional solution on E in Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria.
By the three theorems discussed above, we can summarize as follows:
Corollary: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism g * ∈ G be given as above. Then, both the (1)-type and the (2)-type g * -implicit extensive game forms respectively triply implement the proportional solution on E in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria.
This result implies that the mechanism g * implements the solution even if it permits each agent various kinds of freedom: he may choose his own supply of labor time freely; he is permitted to overstate his labor skill; he can behave unilaterally or coalitionally; and he can behave strong-rationally, as in the subgame-perfect response, or weak-rationally, as in the Nash-like response.
Concluding remarks
We have proposed a feasible sharing mechanism which triply implements the proportional solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria, even when agents can not only understate, but also overstate their labor skills. The performance of our mechanism is summarized in Table 1 , which provides a comparison with other relevant mechanisms.
Insert Table 1 around here.
As shown in Table 1 , our mechanism has two undesirable features. First, it lacks continuity. Second, the mechanism fails to meet balancedness or nonwastefulness. One reason is that the mechanism permits agents to both overstate and/or understate their labor skills. So, it is difficult to find the deviator when only aggregate information
Therefore, the mechanism basically punishes all agents when there must be a deviator. The other reason is that this mechanism is labor sovereign. The labor sovereign mechanism should accept a profile of the agents' choice of labor time as an outcome, even when it may constitute a non-desirable allocation. Thus, if the mechanism needs to punish potential deviators, it is only possible by reducing their shares of output, which leads it to violate balancedness. We conjecture that there may be a trade-off between labor sovereignty and balancedness. However, it is still an open question whether or not there exists a mechanism which satisfies labor sovereignty and balancedness, and implements the proportional solution.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose there exists j ∈ N with s j 6 = s t j and y j ) by the strict monotonicity of utility functions. Thus, in any case, it contradicts the fact that (s, x, w) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (u, s t ) ∈ E be any given.
(
Let z = (x, y) ∈ P R (u, s t ). Then, if the strategy profile of agents is
If the deviation induces
Rule 2, then x 0 j > 0. Hence, it must be the case that g * j ³ s
If the deviation induces Rule 1-2-2 with s
x j´´m ust be on the same line that passes through (0, 0). Since f is concave, f must be linear on a closed interval
Since z is Pareto efficient, the deviation gives no additional benefit to j. Consider the case that the deviation induces Rule 1-2-2 with s
x j´ḿ ust be on the line that starts from (0, 0) and passes through ( P s
Since f is concave, f must be linear on a closed interval h 0, max n P s
and z is Pareto efficient, the deviation gives no additional benefit to j.
Next, if the deviation induces Rule 1-1 with s 
The Pareto efficiency of z implies no additional benefit for j.
n be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the feasible sharing game (g * , u, s t ). Suppose that (s, x, w) induces Rule 2. If N 0 (x) = ∅, then g * i (s, x, w) = 0 for all i ∈ N. Note that when Rule 2 is induced, there exists at least an individual j ∈ N such that If #N 0 (x) = 1 and #N\N 0 (x) ≥ 2, then there exists at least an indi- 
Note that by Assumption 1, x À 0. Moreover, f ( P s j x j ) = f ¡P s t j x j ¢ holds. Therefore, Lemma 1 implies it must be the case that s = s t .
Since (s, x, w) is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that for all i ∈ N and all (s Thus, the facts together imply the Pareto efficiency of z, or z ∈ P R (u, s t ).
(3) Show SNA (g * , e) = NA (g * , e) for all e ∈ E.
Let e = (u, s t ) ∈ E be any given. By definition, SNA (g * , e) ⊆ NA (g * , e). Suppose SNA (g * , e) ( NA (g * , e). Then, there exists (s, x, w) ∈ NE (g * , e) such that for some T ( N and some (s or all j ∈ T . Since (s, x, w) ∈ NE (g * , e) corresponds to Rule 1-1 as is shown in the proof of Theorem 1, (s, x, w) is PR-consistent, which implies x À 0 under Assumption 1. Hence s = s t by Lemma 1. Note also that T = N is eliminated by Pareto efficiency of NA (g * , e). By construction of g * , there is at most one agent who can enjoy a positive amount of output under Rules 1-2-1, 1-2-2, 1-3, and 2. Proof of Theorem 3. Since NA (g * , e) = P R (e) and SP A ¡ Γ 2 g * , e ¢ ⊆ NA (g * , e) for all e ∈ E, we have only to show P R (e) ⊆ SP A ¡ Γ 2 g * , e ¢ for all e ∈ E. First, we will show that in every second stage subgame, there is at least one Nash equilibrium strategy.
Let us define a strategy profile (s e , w e ) of the given second stage subgame ¡ Γ where NA means "Nash implementability," SNA means "strong Nash implementability," UNA means "undominated Nash implementability," and SP A means "subgame-perfect implementability."
